Users and Internet service providers (ISPs) are constantly a ected by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. is cyber threat continues to grow even with the development of new protection technologies. Developing mechanisms to detect this threat is a current challenge in network security. is article presents a machine learning-(ML-) based DoS detection system. e proposed approach makes inferences based on signatures previously extracted from samples of network tra c. e experiments were performed using four modern benchmark datasets. e results show an online detection rate (DR) of attacks above 96%, with high precision (PREC) and low false alarm rate (FAR) using a sampling rate (SR) of 20% of network tra c.
Introduction
In recent years, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have caused signi cant nancial losses to industry and governments worldwide, as shown in information security reports [1] . ese records are in line with the growing number of devices connected to the Internet, especially driven by the popularization of ubiquitous computing, materialized through the Internet of ings (IoT) [2] paradigm and characterized by the concept of connecting anything, anywhere, anytime. In most Internet scenarios, devices interact with applications that run remotely on the network, which enables malicious agents to take control of devices. In this way, it is possible to have the interruption of services or the use of devices as a launching point of attacks for diverse domains, as is the case of the DDoS attack [3] , which has been consolidated for several reasons, such as (i) simplicity and facility of execution, not requiring vast technological knowledge on the attacker side, and (ii) variety of platforms and applications for facilitated attack orchestration. Many of these attacks succeeded in disrupting essential Internet services such as DNS, a ecting millions of users around the world [4] , and commercial platforms such as the GitHub [5] , prompting severe nancial losses to the organizations that depend on those services.
One of the most dangerous malicious tra c on the Internet is the DDoS volumetric attack, which is responsible for more than 65% of all such attacks [6] . In a volumetric DDoS attack, several attackers coordinate the sending of a high rate of useless data in an attempt to overload the victim's computing resources or the near network links. On the one hand, the high success rates for this type of attack occur because the main Internet routers typically use the FIFO (First-In-First-Out) and DROP-TAIL queuing disciplines, which do not di erentiate between types of tra c, imposing equal loss rates for attacks and legitimate tra c. Although legitimate tra c tends to retreat to prevent further congestion, attack tra c does not have this commitment and causes the links to be exceeded. As a consequence, legitimate tra c is also obstructed [6] . On the other hand, the attackers are using more advanced techniques to potentiate attacks and ood the victim such as DDoS-for-hire, IoT-based DDoS attacks, and reflection DDoS attacks [7] [8] [9] , profiting from the computational capability and geographical distribution promoted by the wide variety of devices and its diverse mobility patterns, typically founded in IoT and mobile IoT scenarios.
In addition to the volumetric DDoS attack, low-volume attacks are on the radar of security experts. It is a more sneaky attack that uses few invading hosts; events are fast, sometimes lasting only a few minutes and usually less than an hour. For these reasons, security teams do not know that their sites are under attack because common tools do not detect this type of threat [10] . Typically, low-volume DDoS exploits application layer protocols, respects other protocols, does not overload links, but causes exhaustion of victim resources.
Problem Statements. DDoS detection and mitigation
have been under study in both the scientific community and industry for several years. e related literature reveals that several studies have undertaken to propose solutions to deal with this problem in a general way [6, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Another group of works dedicated themselves to presenting specific solutions for high-volume and low-volume DDoS attacks [8, 13, 16] . Furthermore, despite the diverse recommendations for mitigating DDoS attacks proposed by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and guidelines documented through Request for Comments (RFC), these attacks still occur with high frequency.
A study carried out years ago [17] revealed that the ineffectiveness of detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks is directly related to constant configuration errors and wasted time due to the lack of tools that follow the dynamics of the network without constant human interference. is has led researchers to use autonomous solutions that can operate (detect and mitigate) based on the behavior and characteristics of the traffic. In this sense, the adoption of solutions with techniques based on artificial intelligence, mainly machine learning (ML), has been distinguished by offering high flexibility in the classification process, consequently improving the detection of malicious traffic [18, 19] . e industrial sector offers DDoS protection as a service through large structures, usually operated by specialized providers [6] such as Akamai, Cloudflare, and Arbor Networks, which have large processing capacity and proprietary filtering mechanisms. But the industry also has problems, such as fragility in routing traffic, usually via Domain Name System (DNS) or Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), difficulty detecting slow attacks, and privacy issues, which drive away some customer segments as governments.
Finding the balance between academic propositions and the industrial practice of combating DDoS is a big challenge. e academy invests in techniques such as machine learning (ML) and proposes to apply them in areas such as DDoS detection in Internet of ings (IoT) [20, 21] sensors, wireless sensors [22] , cloud computing [23] and softwaredefined networking (SDN) [18] and work on producing more realistic datasets [24, 25] and more effective means of result validation [26, 27] . On the other hand, industry segments gradually invested in new paradigms in their solutions such as network function virtualization (NFV) and SDN [28, 29] to apply scientific discoveries and modernize network structures. Even so, the incidents of DDoS still happen daily, reinforcing that the problem is not solved.
Proposal.
Realizing these issues, this article proposes Smart Detection, a novel defense mechanism against DDoS attacks. e system architecture was designed to detect both high-and low-volume DDoS attacks. e proposed system acts as a sensor that can be installed anywhere on the network and classifies online traffic using an MLA-based strategy that makes inferences utilizing random traffic samples collected on network devices via stream protocol. e proposed approach is compatible with the Internet infrastructure and does not require software or hardware upgrades. Besides, user data privacy is guaranteed at all stages of system operation. (v) An approach to automatic feature selection has been developed using the cross-validation technique for model searches that meet specific classification quality criteria. is approach was used to define the signatures adopted by Smart Detection.
Related Works and Background
e research on intrusion detection in computer networks is widely discussed in the literature. Several detection techniques and protection strategies have been proposed in recent years. Studies in the literature classify the IDSs as signature-based, anomaly-based, and hybrid systems. e first type identifies potential attacks by comparing current observed events with its stored signatures. e second one detects anomalies by identifying significant deviations between the preestablished normal profile and the current events. In all cases, an alert will be generated if any signature is matched or if a deviation occurs above a set threshold. e main advantage of the signature-based approach is the low false alarm rate. However, the challenge is to write signatures that cover all possible attack variations. In contrast, the anomaly-based approach has the ability to detect unknown attacks, but it requires more computational resources and often produces more false alarms. Hybrid solutions try to exploit the benefits of both techniques [11, 30] . DoS attacks are a specific type of network intrusion that has drawn the attention of academia, as highlights recent surveys on network applications, wireless networks, cloud computing, and big data [8, 13, 14, 31] .
Several classification strategies of DDoS attacks have been proposed in the literature in the last decade. However, DDoS flooding attacks have been further studied, being classified into two categories based on the protocol level that is targeted [3] : e biggest challenge in combating DDoS attacks lies in the early detection and mitigation of attacks as close as possible to their origin; however, the implementation of a comprehensive solution that addresses these features has not yet been achieved [3, 32] .
Some recent work has inspired the development of the Smart Detection system. ese approaches are listed in Table 1 for comparative purposes.
A Hypertext Transfer Protocol-(HTTP-) based technique [16] was proposed to detect flood attacks in web servers using data sampling. e authors used the CUM-SUM algorithm to determine whether the analyzed traffic is normal or a DoS attack by focusing on two features: the number of application layer requests and the number of packets with payload size equal to zero. e results showed a detection rate between 80 and 88% using a sampling rate of 20%. Although it has made important advances, the proposed method does not seem applicable in automatic mitigation systems, especially in production environments that do not support high sampling rates. D-FACE is a collaborative defense system [34] that uses a generalized entropy (GE) and generalized information distance (GID) metrics in detecting different types of DDoS attacks and flash events (FEs). In this context, an FE is similar to a volumetric DDoS wherein thousands of legitimate users try to access a particular computing resource such as a website simultaneously.
e results show that D-FACE can detect DDoS attacks and FEs. Although the work presents relevant contributions, the validation used obsolete datasets. In addition, the proposed collaboration approach requires a high degree of ISP engagement, so it restricts the industrial use of the solution.
Antidose system [33] presents a means of interaction between a vulnerable peripheral service and an indirectly related Autonomous System (AS), which allows the AS to confidently deploy local filtering rules under the control of the remote service. e system was evaluated using Mininet, but no benchmark dataset was used. e approach proposed by the authors faces strong resistance from ISPs for two reasons: the first is software and hardware update requirement and the second is having no control over local traffic control policies.
e SkyShield system [35] has been proposed to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks on the application layer. In the detection phase, SkyShield exploits the divergence between two hash tables (Sketches) to detect anomalies caused by attacker hosts. e mitigation phase uses filtering, whitelisting, blacklisting, and CAPTCHA as protection mechanisms. e system was evaluated using customized datasets. SkyShield has focused on the application layer, more specifically on the HTTP protocol, so the proposed system is vulnerable to flooding at the network layer and transport layer.
Umbrella [36] develops a multilayered defense architecture to defend against a wide spectrum of DDoS attacks. e authors proposed an approach based on detection and protection exclusively on the victim's side. e system was evaluated using the customized testbed in terms of traffic control. e authors claim that the system is capable of dealing with mass attacks. However, this approach is widely used in industry and proved to be inefficient against truly massive DDoS attacks.
Recently, a semi-supervised machine learning system addressed the classification of DDoS attacks. In this approach, CICIDS2017 dataset was used to evaluate system performance metrics [37] . Although the work addresses the recent DoS vectors, the online performance of the method has not been evaluated. Finally, Table 1 summarizes these recent works whose approach is related to the proposal of this article.
In Table 1 , Online indicates that the proposed system has been tested in online experiments and dataset informs the dataset used for validation, while L/H DoS indicates whether it detects slow and high DDoS attacks. Sampling indicates whether some network traffic sampling method is used.
Based on the open questions in the literature and recent specialized reports, DoS attacks may remain on the Internet for some time. e solution to this problem includes the adoption of detection and mitigation strategies that are practical and economically viable. Besides, these approaches should leverage existing provider infrastructure and be implemented in light of new scientific and technological trends.
Smart Detection
Smart Detection is designed to combat DDoS attacks on the Internet in a modern collaborative way. In this approach, the system collects network traffic samples and classifies them. Attack notification messages are shared using a cloud platform for convenient use by traffic control protection systems. e whole process is illustrated in Figure 1 . e core of the detection system consists of a Signature Dataset (SDS) and a machine learning algorithm (MLA). Figure 2 shows the crucial steps from model build to system operation.
First, normal traffic and DDoS signatures were extracted, labeled, and stored in a database. SDS was then created using feature selection techniques. Finally, the most accurate MLA was selected, trained, and loaded into the traffic classification system. e architecture of the detection system was designed to work with samples of network traffic provided by industrial standard traffic sampling protocols, collected from network devices. e unlabeled samples are received and grouped in flow tables in the receiver buffer. us, when the table length is greater than or equal to the reference value, they are presented to the classifier responsible for labeling them, as shown in Figure 3 . If the flow table expires, it may be processed one more time.
e occurrence of small flow tables is higher at lower sampling rates or under some types of DoS attacks, e.g., SYN flood attacks. Table 2 details the parameters for fine tuning of the system. e complete algorithm of the detection system is summarized in Figure 4 . During each cycle of the detection process, traffic samples are received and stored in a flow table. For each new flow, a unique identifier (FlowID) is calculated based on the 5-tuple (src_IP, dst_IP, src_port, dst_port, and transport_protocol) in steps 1 and 2. If this is a new flow, i.e., there is not any other flow table stored with the same FlowID, the flow table is registered in a shared memory buffer. Otherwise, if there is a flow table registered with the same FlowID such as the previously calculated one, the data of the new flow will be merged with the data in the existing flow table in steps 3 and 4. After the merging operation, if the table length is greater than or equal to the reference value (T l ≥ T max ), the flow table is classified, and if it is found to be an attack, a notification is emitted. Otherwise, it is inserted back into the shared memory buffer. Meanwhile, in step 7, the cleanup task looks for expired flow tables in the shared buffer, i.e., flow tables that exceed the expiration time of the system (E > E T ). For each expired flow table, the system checks the table length. If the flow table length is less than or equal to the minimum reference value (T l ≤ T min ), this flow table will be processed by step 8. A new FlowID is calculated using the 3-tuple (src_IP, dst_IP, and transport_protocol), as the flow table is routed back to steps 3 and 4.
Traffic Sampling. Smart Detection uses a network traffic
sampling technique because processing all the packets in the network can be a computationally expensive task, even if only the packet headers are parsed. In many cases, performing a deep inspection and analyzing the data area of the application layer is unfeasible for detection systems. Among the protocols adopted by the industry for sampling network traffic, the sFlow protocol is widely used in current devices. e technique used by sFlow is called n-out-of-N sampling. In this technique, n samples are selected out of N packets. One way to achieve a simple random sample is to randomly generate n different numbers in the range of 1 to N and then choose all packets with a packet position equal to one of the n values.
is procedure is repeated for every N packets. Besides, the sample size is fixed in this approach [38] . e sFlow monitoring system consists of an agent (embedded in a switch, a router, or an independent probe) and a collector. e architecture used in the monitoring system is designed to provide continuous network monitoring of high-speed switched and routed devices. e agent uses the sampling technology to capture traffic statistics from the monitored device and forward them to a collector system [39] .
Feature Extraction.
In supervised classification strategies, a set of examples is required for training the classifier model. is set is commonly defined as the signature database. Each instance of the database has a set of characteristics or variables associated with a label or a class. In this work, the goal is to identify characteristics in network traffic that are able to distinguish the normal network behavior from DoS attacks. e study is focused on the analysis of the header variables of the network and transport layer packets of the TCP/IP architecture because it allows saving computational resources and simplifies the deployment in the ISP networks.
In IPv4-compliant networks, the network and transport layer protocols are IP, TCP, and UDP, which are specified in RFC 791 [40], RFC 793 [41] , and RFC 768 [42] , respectively. Together, such protocols have a total of 25 header variables. However, widely used network traffic sampling protocols such as NetFlow [43] and sFlow [39] use only a portion of these variables in the sampling process. Commonly, the seven used variables are the source and destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, transport layer protocol, IP packet size, and TCP flags. e source and destination IP addresses are not very useful for identifying the network traffic behavior in the Internet environment, which reduces the number of variables available for analysis to five in the most common cases. Based on the five variables mostly used by the flow monitoring protocols, 33 variables were derived, as described in Table 3 , which use statistical measures that express data variability. In the calculation context of the database variables, the references to the mean, median, variance (var), and standard deviation (std) should be interpreted as sample measures. e variable named protocol is a simple normalization of the protocol field extracted from the transport layer packet headers in the form:
where N proto is the code of the protocol and K is an normalization constant set to the value 1,000. For instance, N proto � 6 and N proto � 17 in TCP and UDP protocols, respectively.
With the main four variables mostly used in flow monitoring, it is possible to calculate the following associated statistic measurements:
(i) Entropy: the entropy of the variable is calculated by
where X is the variable of interest, e.g., the source port. (ii) Coefficient of variation: the coefficient of variation is calculated by
where std(X) is the estimated standard deviation and mean(X) is the estimated average of the variable. (iii) Quantile coefficient: this parameter is defined herein by
where Q X (p) is the sample p-quantile, p ∈ (0, 0.5), expressed by [44] Security and Communication Networks with being X (1) , . . . , X (n) the order statistics of independent observations, X 1 , . . . , X n , k � ⌊p * n⌋, and f is the fractional part of the index surrounded by X (k) and X (k+1) . (iv) Rate of change: this metric is given by
(v) where U X is the amount of unique values and S X is the overall number of X values. e data traffic with normal activity behavior was extracted from the ISCXIDS2012 dataset [45] . e data traffic with DoS behavior was obtained in a laboratory controlled environment using tools such as hping3 [46] , hulk [47] , Goldeneye [48] , and slowhttptest [49] .
Processes such as extracting, transforming, and labeling the database instances are summarized in Figure 5 . e raw network traffic was extracted from the capture files, as the packets were then grouped into sessions. For each session, one instance of the descriptor database containing all variables listed in Table 3 was calculated. In this study, only the sessions with five hundred packets or higher were considered to better represent each network traffic type. e final database contains examples of normal traffic (23,088 instances), TCP flood attacks (14,988 instances), UDP flood (6,894 instances), HTTP flood (347 instances), and HTTP slow (183 instances).
Feature and MLA Selection.
Feature selection is an important step in the pattern recognition process and consists of defining the smallest possible set of variables capable of efficiently describing a set of classes [50] . Several techniques for variable selection are available in the literature and implemented in software libraries as scikit-learn [51] . In this work, the selection of variables was performed in two stages. First, Recursive Feature Elimination with Cross-Validation (RFECV) was used with some machine learning algorithms widely used in the scientific literature, i.e., random Forest (RF), logistic regression (LR), AdaBoost, stochastic gradient descent (SGD), decision tree (DTree), and perceptron. RF obtained higher precision using 28 variables, while AdaBoost selected seven variables, but obtained lower accuracy, as shown in Table 4 . In the second stage, a new feature selection test was performed with RF using proposed Algorithm 1.
In the proposed feature selection approach using RF, the number of variables was reduced from 28 to 20 with a small increase in accuracy, as shown in Table 5 . e proposed algorithm was executed using the following input parameters: 1,000 rounds, 99% of variable importance, 95% of global accuracy, and 85% of per-class accuracy. Figure 6 shows that most models tested used 20 variables. However, each model used specific sets of variables. In order to choose the most relevant variables from the selected models, the RF variable importance criterion was used, as described in line 25 of Algorithm 1. e final result of feature selection is shown in Figure 7 .
e results show that RF obtained higher accuracy than the other algorithms. Although it uses more variables than SGD and AdaBoost, a low false alarm rate is a prime requirement in DDoS detection systems. In this case, RF proved to be the best algorithm option for the Smart Detection system. Random forest is a supervised learning algorithm that builds a large number of random decision trees and merges them together to make predictions. Each tree is trained with a random subset of the total set of labeled samples. In the classification process, the most voted class among all the trees in the model indicates the result of the classifier [52] . In the proposed detection system algorithm shown in Figure 4 , RF is used to classify online network traffic, a task that requires computational efficiency and high hit rates.
Results
e network traffic was classified by the detection system in a controlled network environment using different sampling rates. In the experiments, raw network traffic of the CIC-DoS [16] , CICIDS2017 [25] , and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 [25] datasets and the raw network traffic captured in the customized testbed experiments were employed. e Smart Detection system has reached high accuracy and low false-positive rate. Experiments were conducted using two Virtual Linux boxes, (4) Define all the descriptor database variables as the current variables; (5) while True do (6) Split dataset in training and test partitions; (7) Create and train the model using training data partition; (8) Select the most important variables from the trained model; (9) Calculate the cumulative importance of variables from the trained model; (10) if max (cumulative importance of variables) < Variable importance threshold then (11) Exit loop; (12) end (13) Train the model using only the most important variables; (14) Test the trained model and calculate the accuracy; (15) if Calculated accuracy < Accuracy threshold then (16) Exit loop; (17) end (18) Add current model to optimized model set; (19) Define the most important variables from the trained model as the current variables; (20) end (21) end (22) Group the models by number of variables; (23) Remove outliers from the grouped model set; (24) Select the group of models with the highest frequency and their number of variables "N"; (25) Rank the variables by the mean of the importance calculated in step 7; (26) Return the "N" most important variables; [25] . In this study, the datasets CIC-DoS, CICIDS2017, and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 and customized dataset were used since they include modern threats and DoS techniques.
e ISCXIDS2012 Dataset.
e Information Security Center of Excellence (ISCX) IDS 2012 dataset (ISC-XIDS2012) was built in at the University of New Brunswick to provide a contemporary benchmark. e dataset traced real packets for seven days of network activity, including HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3, and FTP protocols covering various scenarios of normal and malicious activities. ISCXIDS2012 consists of labeled network traces, including full packet payloads in pcap format and is publicly available (https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids.html) [45] .
is work focuses on the normal activities of the ISC-XIDS2012 pcap file for extraction of signatures, more specifically data file of Friday, 11/6/2010.
e CIC-DoS Dataset.
e CIC-DoS dataset focuses on application layer DoS attacks mixed with the ISC-XIDS2012 dataset attack-free traces. Four kinds of attacks were produced with different tools, yielding 8 different DoS attack strokes from the application layer [16] . e resulting set contains 24 hours of network traffic with a total size of 4.6 GB and is publicly available (https://www.unb.ca/cic/ datasets/dos-dataset.html). A summary of the attack events and tools used in the CIC-DoS is presented in Table 6 .
In the execution of the low-volume attacks using tool slowhttptest [49] , the default value of 50 connections per attack was adopted, thus making the attacks more sneaky according to [16] .
4.1.3.
e CICIDS2017 Dataset. CICIDS2017 dataset was recently developed by ISCX and contains benign traffic and the most up-to-date common attacks. is new IDS dataset includes seven common updated family of attacks that met the real-world criteria and is publicly available (http://www. unb.ca/cic/datasets/IDS2017.html) [25] .
is work focuses on the malicious DoS activities of the Wednesday, July 5, 2017, capture file, which consist of five DoS/DDoS attacks and a wide variety of normal network traffic. e resulting set contains 8h of network traffic with a total size of 13G. e attack tools used include slowloris, Slowhttptest, Hulk, GoldenEye, and Heartbleed.
e CSE-CIC-IDS2018 Dataset.
is dataset is a collaborative project between the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC). e final dataset includes seven different attack scenarios: brute force, Heartbleed, Botnet, DoS, DDoS, web attacks, and infiltration of the network from inside. e attacking infrastructure includes 50 machines, and the victim organization has 5 departments and includes 420 machines and 30 servers. A research document outlining the dataset analysis details and similar related principles has been published by [25] . All data are publicly available (https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids-2018.html).
is work focuses on the malicious DoS/DDoS activities of Friday, February 16, 2018, and Tuesday, February 20, 
e Customized Dataset.
e customized dataset was developed in a controlled network environment, as shown in Figure 8 . VLANs 10, 20, 30, and 40 are used as victim hosts. VLAN 165 is dedicated to the users of an academic unit. VLAN 60 is used as an attacking host, while monitoring occurs in VLAN 1. All networks have regular access to the Internet. e attack plan was configured so that one attack is generated every 30 minutes, in a total of 48 attack events in 24 hours, starting at 00 h00 m00 s and ending at 23 h59 m00 s. All attacks were executed by attacker host 172. 16 .60.100, during which it did not transmit legitimate traffic to the victims. e attack tools were parameterized to produce sneaky low-volume, medium-volume or light mode, and massive high-volume attacks. Ten variations of protocol-based and application-based attacks were adopted using four attack tools, as shown in Table 7 . e duration of protocol-based and high-volume application-based attacks was 30 seconds, while low-volume application-based attacks ranged from 30 to 240 seconds.
In the accomplishment of low-volume attacks using tool slowhttptest [49] , the number of connection parameters was adopted as 1,500, instead of the default option corresponding to 50 connections.
Online Experiments.
Online experiments were performed in a controlled laboratory environment according to the following validation methodology:
(1) Raw data of the network traffic are obtained for analysis in pcap file format. (2) e attack plan indicating the origin, destination, attack type, and respective duration for the traffic indicated in step 1 is drawn. (3) e environment for reprocessing and classifying the traffic is configured. (4) e traffic is processed and classified. (5) e system performance is properly evaluated by comparing the output from step 4 with the attack plan described in step 2.
Following this validation methodology, the sources of traffic capture were used: CIC-DoS, CICIDS2017, CSE-CIC-IDS2018, and customized dataset, thus fulfilling steps 1 and 2. e environment for traffic reprocessing and classification as described in step 3 was configured using two Virtual Linux boxes running Open Virtual Switch (OVS) [28] , TcpReplay software [53] , and the Smart Detection system, as shown in Figure 9 .
In the reprocessing, classification, and evaluation of the traffic during steps 4 and 5, the raw data traffic was replayed by TcpReplay software in a specific OVS port and sampled by the sFlow agent for OVS. e sampled traffic was sent to the Smart Detection system and the classification result was compared with the attack plan. Figure 9 summarizes the procedures carried out by the proposed validation methodology. e raw network traffic file is reprocessed on VM-01, and the sFlow agent collects traffic samples and sends them to Smart Detection on VM-02.
System Setup.
e smart Detection system has three main parameters that directly influence its performance. ese parameters shown in Table 1 allow the user to calibrate the detection system according to the operating environment. In scenarios where the SR is too low and the T max is too large, for example, traffic samples are discarded before processing by the classifier. On the other hand, if T max is too small, the FAR increases because the classifier has few data to analyze. In the case of slow DDoS, low SR and large T max also reduce the attack detection rate due to in-memory flow table expiration time (E T � 2).
So, several experiments to calibrate the system were performed using (i) SR of 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%; (ii) T max parameter of 25, 50, and 100; and (iii) E T of 2, 5, and 10 seconds in the testing environment. e most balanced result was obtained with SR � 10%, T max � 50, and E T � 2.
Evaluation Metrics.
System performance was evaluated using the Precision (PREC), Recall (REC), and F-Measure (F1) metrics present in the literature [54, 55] . PREC measures the ability to avoid false positive, while REC measures system sensitivity. F1 is a harmonic average between PREC and REC. In this context, (i) true positive (TP) is the attack traffic predicted correctly, (ii) true negative (TN) is normal traffic also predicted correctly, (iii) false positive (FP) is the normal traffic predicted incorrectly, and (iv) false negative (FN) is the attack traffic predicted incorrectly. ese metrics were computed by the following expressions:
Besides, the detection rate (DR) and false alarm rate (FAR) metrics were used. e DR is the ratio between the number of attacks detected by the system and the actual number of attacks performed. FAR is the ratio between FP 
where A D is the number of detected attacks and T A is the total number of performed attacks.
where FP corresponds to the false-positive classifications and TN is the true-positive classifications.
e DR and FAR calculations assume that only malicious traffic was sent from the attacker to the victim at the time of the attack.
Results and Discussion.
e proposed approach has been evaluated using the aforementioned datasets, system setup, and metrics. Table 8 summarizes the system performance for each dataset.
As can be observed, the best performance was obtained in the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, with a DR of 100%, an FAR of 0.000%, and a PREC of 100%. During the analysis, there was a low occurrence of normal network traffic and well-defined bursts of malicious traffic. is type of behavior facilitates detection by the system and justifies the high hit rates achieved. However, a slightly lower performance was obtained in the customized dataset and CIC-DoS dataset, with a DR of 96.5% and 93.6%, an FAR of 0.2% and 0.04%, and a PREC of 99.5% and 99.9%, respectively. In those datasets, there is a higher volume of normal traffic and various types of attacks, including stealth application layer attacks. In this more realistic scenario, the proposed system presented some detection failures, but still obtained a competitive performance. On the other hand, the worst result was obtained with the CICIDS2017 dataset with 80% is dataset expresses a more realistic network scenario, which includes normal traffic mixed with high-volume and low-volume malicious traffic with sneaky behavior, such as slow application layer attacks. Even so, the proposed system detected 4 out of 5 attacks with PREC greater than 90% and FAR less than 1%, showing that the method is feasible.
To discuss online detection and consumption of computing resources during experimentation, the CICIDS2017 dataset was chosen because it is quite realistic, recent, and summarizes the major vectors of DoS attacks. Even in the most adverse scenario, the experiment was completed normally, as shown in Figures 10 and 11 . Overall network traffic is demonstrated in Figure 10 (a), while Figure 10 (b) highlights the sampled traffic sent to the detection system. As can be seen, for network traffic of 81.3 Mbps, the detection system receives only 1.74 Mbps, making this approach scalable. Overall traffic rating is shown in Figure 11 (a), while Figure 11 (b) exclusively highlights malicious traffic rating. It can be said that the system was efficient in distinguishing the normal traffic from the DoS attacks because of all the attacks performed, only the Heartbleed attack was not detected, highlighted in Figure 10 (b) between 15 h and 16 h. is kind of attack is primarily intended to collect data by exploiting OpenSSL software vulnerabilities as described in CVE-2014-0160, although it can also assume the behavior of a DDoS attack, as in any application. However, in this case, the system raised a false negative. e most obvious reasons for this FN are (i) the execution of the Heartbleed attack without DoS exploitation, or (ii) statistical coincidence in traffic sampling. In the first case, the attack is performed using legitimate and regular connections, while in the second case, the collected samples coincide with legitimate traffic signatures.
In terms of resource use, the system remained stable during the experiment, as shown in Figure 11 (c), with small swings in CPU usage.
Finally, the Smart Detection system was tested using online network traffic in four distinct scenarios. e results presented in Table 8 with significant rates of accuracy. e experiments also highlighted the importance of adjusting the T max and E T parameters. ese variables correlate with the network traffic sampling rate (SR) and directly influence the detection rate and system accuracy.
Additional Comparison.
Compared with some recent similar works available in the literature, the approach introduced in this work is quite competitive in terms of the evaluated performance metrics, as shown in Table 9 . e comparison is not completely fair because the experimental scenarios and data were slightly different, but it is sufficient to allow an evaluation of the obtained results. For instance, in the offline experiments performed with the CIC-DoS dataset in [16] , DR was 76.92% using an SR of 20%, while the proposed system obtained an online DR of 90% for the attacks with a FAR of 1.8% using the same sampling technique. In [37] , a PREC of 82.1% was obtained using the CICIDS2017 dataset in the offline and unsampled analysis. In this work, the proposed method obtained a PREC of 99.9%, which can be considered competitive for an online detection system based on samples of network traffic. Besides that, in the CICIDS2017 dataset experiments, where the legitimate traffic rate is similar to that of attack traffic, according to Figures 10(b) , 11(a), and 11(b), the system was also able to distinguish malicious traffic from normal traffic, such as studied in the lecture [34] .
Conclusion
is article has presented the Smart Detection system, an online approach to DoS/DDoS attack detection. e software uses the Random Forest Tree algorithm to classify network traffic based on samples taken by the sFlow protocol directly from network devices. Several experiments were performed to calibrate and evaluate system performance. Results showed that the proposed method is feasible and presents improved performance when compared with some recent and relevant approaches available in the literature. e proposed system was evaluated based on three intrusion detection benchmark datasets, namely, CIC-DoS, CICIDS2017, and CSE-CIC-IDS2018, and was able to classify various types of DoS/DDoS attacks, such as TCP flood, UDP flood, HTTP flood, and HTTP slow. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed method was compared against recent and related approaches. Based on the experimental results, the Smart Detection approach delivers improved DR, FAR, and PREC. For example, in the CIC-DoS and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 datasets, the proposed system acquired DR and PREC higher than 93% with FAR less than 1%. Although the system has achieved significant results in its scope, it needs some improvements, such as a better hit rate among attack classes and an automatic parameter calibration mechanism that maximizes the detection rate of attacks. Table 9 : Comparison with research approaches of related works.
Work
Dataset DR FAR PREC [16] CIC-DoS 0.7690 N/A N/A [37] CICIDS2017 N/A N/A 0.8210 e proposed approach CIC-DoS 0.9360 0.0004 0.9990 e proposed approach CICIDS2017 0.8000 0.0020 0.9920
